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Abstract
We consider the indifference valuation of an uncertain monetary payoff from the
perspective of an uncertainty averse decision maker. We study how the indifference
valuation depends on the decision maker’s attitudes toward uncertainty. We obtain a
characterization of comparative uncertainty aversion and various characterizations of
increasing, decreasing, and constant uncertainty aversion.
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1 Introduction
The indifference prices are the boundaries delimiting the prices of a contract that would be
agreed to by an individual who prefers more money to less money and who endeavors to
maximize the relative desirability of her monetary endowment. The technique of indifference
pricing was introduced by Bernoulli (1738) contextually with the prediction that an indi-
vidual evaluates the relative desirability of alternative monetary prospects by their expected
utility. The consistency of the paradigm of expected utility maximization and, accordingly, of
the resulting indifference prices, with criteria of logic and rationality, was established by von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) in a framework where the probabilities of future events
are objectively determined, and extended by Savage (1972) to a framework where the prob-
abilities of future events are subjectively determined (see also Ramsey (1931) and de Finetti
(1964)). The indifference prices defined by the expected utility representation of preferences
were further studied by Pratt (1964) in relation to the characterization of an individual’s
attitudes toward risk. Pratt (1964) found that an individual is more risk averse than another
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if and only if the maximum price that she would offer to avoid a risky monetary prospect is
larger than for the other, and that an individual is increasingly risk averse if and only if the
maximum price that she would offer to avoid a risky monetary prospect is larger the larger her
constant initial wealth. Pratt (1964) further observed that an individual is increasingly risk
averse if and only if the degree of relative convexity of her utility function (de Finetti (1952))
or Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion (Arrow (1970) and Pratt (1964)) is an
increasing function, and that this technical condition allows to immediately verify whether
an expected utility representation of preferences exhibits increasing, decreasing, or constant
risk aversion.
In this paper we study the indifference prices defined by the uncertainty averse representa-
tion of preferences of Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a) and their relationship with an individual’s
attitudes toward uncertainty. We find that an individual is more uncertainty averse than an-
other if and only if the maximum price that she would offer to avoid an uncertain monetary
prospect is larger than for the other, and that an individual is increasingly uncertainty averse
if and only if the maximum price that she would offer to avoid an uncertain monetary prospect
is larger the larger her constant initial wealth. We further develop the characterization of
increasing, decreasing, and constant uncertainty aversion and we provide a technical condi-
tion that allows to easily verify whether an uncertainty averse representation of preferences
exhibits increasing, decreasing, or constant uncertainty aversion. We find that the variational
representation of preferences of Maccheroni et al. (2006) is decreasingly uncertainty averse
and that the multiple priors representation of preferences of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
is constantly uncertainty averse.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the notation, the
background, and the assumptions. In Section 3 we study the properties of the indifference
prices of an uncertainty averse decision maker. In Section 4 we study the characterization
of comparative uncertainty aversion (Subsection 4.1) and of increasing, decreasing, and con-
stant uncertainty aversion (Subsection 4.2) in terms of the indifference prices. In Section
5 we provide some further characterizations of increasing, decreasing, and constant uncer-
tainty aversion in terms of cash-subadditivity of an indifference price (Subsection 5.1) and
of inequalities between the indifference prices (Subsection 5.2). In Section 6 we study the
uncertainty averse representations of preferences that are increasingly, decreasingly, or con-
stantly uncertainty averse. In Section 7 we conclude summarizing the results and providing
some possible directions for future research.
2 Framework
The pair (S,Σ) denotes a measurable space where S is a set of future states of nature and Σ is
a σ-algebra of subsets of S representing future events. The set of all the available monetary
payoffs is indicated by X := B(S,Σ) and it corresponds to the set of all bounded, real-
valued, Σ-measurable functions X on S. The set X includes a subset of constant functions
2
X(s) = x ∈ R∀ s ∈ S which is identified with R. Every equality or inequality involving
elements of X is intended as holding for all s ∈ S. The set of all probabilistic models
is indicated by ∆ := ba+1 (S,Σ) and it corresponds to the set of all bounded, real-valued,
finitely additive set functions P on Σ which are positive and normalized.
The uncertainty averse representation of preferences Uu,G : X → R of Cerreia Vioglio et al.
(2011a) is given by,
Uu,G(X) := inf
P∈∆
G(EP [u(X)], P ) (1)
for all X ∈ X . The function u : R → R is a utility function reflecting the decision maker’s
attitudes toward risk. The function G : R×∆→ (−∞,+∞] is an uncertainty index reflecting
the decision maker’s attitudes toward uncertainty. We assume that the uncertainty index
G is strictly increasing in the first component, quasiconvex, normalized, that is such that
infP∈∆G(x, P ) = x for all x ∈ R, lower semi-continuous, and extended-valued uniformly
equicontinuous on R with respect to P ∈ ∆ (see Section 2.2 in Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a)).
We further assume that the utility function u is strictly increasing and concave. Note that,
as u is concave and finite on all of R, it is necessarily continuous (see Rockafellar (1970,
Corollary 10.1.1)).
Remark 1. Note that, under the above assumption on u, the functional Uu,G defined by
Equation (1) represents the preferences of a decision-maker that is both risk averse and
uncertainty averse. Moreover, Uu,G is strictly increasing, quasiconcave, and continuous.
Remark 2. Note that under some technical conditions the infimum in Equation (1) can be
equivalently taken over the subset ∆σ := ca+1 (S,Σ) of countably additive elements in ∆. See
Theorem 7 in Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a).
An example of uncertainty averse representation of preferences is the variational repre-
sentation of preferences Uu,c : X → R of Maccheroni et al. (2006) which is given by,
Uu,c(X) = inf
P∈∆
(
EP [u(X)] + c(P )
)
for all X ∈ X and for some convex and lower semi-continuous ambiguity index c : ∆ →
(−∞,+∞] such that infP∈∆ c(P ) = 0. The variational representation of preferences is ob-
tained as a particular case of Equation (1) when the uncertainty index G satisfies,
G(x, P ) = x+ c(P ) (2)
for all (x, P ) ∈ R×∆.
A further example of uncertainty averse representation of preferences is the multiple priors
representation of preferences Uu,P : X → R of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) which is given
by,
Uu,P(X) = inf
P∈P
EP [u(X)]
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for all X ∈ X and for some non-empty, closed, and convex set of priors P ⊂ ∆. The multiple
priors representation of preferences is obtained as a particular case of Equation (1) when the
uncertainty index G satisfies,
G(x, P ) = x+ δ(P | P) (3)
for all (x, P ) ∈ R×∆ and where δ(. | P)→ [0,+∞] is defined by,
δ(P | P) =
{
0 if P ∈ P
+∞ otherwise
for all P ∈ ∆.
Remark 3. Note that the representations of preferences of Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a),
Maccheroni et al. (2006), and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) were originally obtained in a
generalized Anscombe and Aumann (1963) framework in which the objects of choice are
uncertain acts, that is Σ-measurable functions on S taking values in a convex subset of
a general vector space. As in this paper we are specifically concerned with the uncertain
acts whose consequences are money payments, we consider the restriction of the original
preference functional to the subset of monetary acts, that is to the Σ-measurable functions
on S taking values in the set of all Dirac measures δx on R, and by virtue of the correspondence
X(s) 7→ δX(s) we identify monetary acts with monetary payoffs in X (see Fo¨llmer and Schied
(2004, Section 2.5)).
3 Indifference Pricing with Uncertainty Averse Prefer-
ences
In this section we study the indifference prices defined by the uncertainty averse represen-
tation of preferences described in Section 2. The properties of the indifference prices will
be further investigated in Section 4 and in Section 5 in relation to the characterization of
comparative uncertainty aversion and of increasing, decreasing, and constant uncertainty
aversion.
3.1 Indifference Buyer’s Price
The indifference buyer’s price, which in this paper is considered from an actuarial perspec-
tive, is defined as a functional piu,Gw0 yielding the maximum price that a decision maker with
uncertainty averse preferences Uu,G and with constant initial wealth w0 would offer to avoid
an uncertain monetary prospect in X (e.g. to receive insurance).
Definition 1. A functional piu,Gw0 : X → R is said to be an indifference buyer’s price if it
satisfies,
u(w0 − piu,Gw0 (X)) = Uu,G(w0 +X)
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for all X ∈ X and w0 ∈ R.
Proposition 1 asserts that an indifference buyer’s price is monotone decreasing, quasi-
convex, and normalized. As a consequence of these properties, an indifference buyer’s price
is a quasiconvex risk measure. Quasiconvex risk measures were introduced in the financial
mathematics literature by Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011b) and further developed by Drapeau
and Kupper (2010).
Proposition 1. An indifference buyer’s price piu,Gw0 : X → R satisfies the following properties
for all X,Y ∈ X .
(i) Decreasing monotonicity: If X ≥ Y , then piu,Gw0 (X) ≤ piu,Gw0 (Y ).
(ii) Quasiconvexity: piu,Gw0 (λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ max{piu,Gw0 (X), piu,Gw0 (Y )} for all λ ∈ [0, 1].
(iii) Normalization: piu,Gw0 (−m) = m for all m ∈ R.
Proof. (i) Let X,Y ∈ X . If X ≥ Y , then by Definition 1 and by the increasing monotonicity
of Uu,G,
u(w0 − piu,Gw0 (X)) = Uu,G(w0 +X) ≥ Uu,G(w0 + Y ) = u(w0 − piu,Gw0 (Y ))
and the increasing monotonicity of u yields piu,Gw0 (X) ≤ piu,Gw0 (Y ). Thus, piu,Gw0 is monotone
decreasing.
(ii) If λ ∈ [0, 1], then by Definition 1, by the quasiconcavity of Uu,G and by the increasing
monotonicity of u,
u(w0 − piu,Gw0 (λX + (1− λ)Y ))
= Uu,G(w0 + λX + (1−λ)Y )
= Uu,G(λ(w0+X) + (1− λ)(w0 + Y ))
≥ min{Uu,G(w0 +X), Uu,G(w0 + Y )}
= min{u(w0 − piu,Gw0 (X)), u(w0 − piu,Gw0 (Y ))}
= u(w0 −max{piu,Gw0 (X), piu,Gw0 (Y )})
and the increasing monotonicity of u yields,
piu,Gw0 (λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ max{piu,Gw0 (X), piu,Gw0 (Y )}
for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, piu,Gw0 is quasiconvex.
(iii) If m ∈ R, then by Definition 1,
u(w0 − piu,Gw0 (m)) = u(w0 +m)
and the strict monotonicity of u yields piu,Gw0 (m) = −m. Thus, piu,Gw0 is normalized.
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For further characterizations of the indifference buyer’s price in terms of its acceptance
family and of its maximal risk function we refer to Giammarino (2011).
3.2 Indifference Seller’s Price
The indifference seller’s price, which in this paper is considered from an actuarial perspec-
tive, is defined as a functional φu,Gw0 yielding the minimum price that a decision maker with
uncertainty averse preferences Uu,G and with constant initial wealth w0 would demand to
accept an uncertain monetary prospect in X (e.g. to provide insurance).
Definition 2. A functional φu,Gw0 : X → R is said to be an indifference seller’s price if it
satisfies,
u(w0) = Uu,G(w0 +X + φu,Gw0 (X))
for all X ∈ X and w0 ∈ R.
Proposition 2 asserts that an indifference seller’s price is monotone decreasing, convex,
cash-additive and normalized. As a result of these properties, an indifference seller’s price
is a cash-additive convex risk measure. Cash-additive convex risk measures were introduced
by Deprez and Gerber (1985) in the actuarial mathematics literature and by Frittelli and
Rosazza Gianin (2002) and Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002) in the financial mathematics literature.
Proposition 2. An indifference seller’s price φu,Gw0 : X → R satisfies the following properties
for all X,Y ∈ X .
(i) Decreasing monotonicity: If X ≥ Y , then φu,Gw0 (X) ≤ φu,Gw0 (Y ).
(ii) Convexity: φu,Gw0 (λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ λφu,Gw0 (X) + (1− λ)φu,Gw0 (Y ) for all λ ∈ [0, 1].
(iii) Cash-additivity: φu,Gw0 (X +m) = φ
u,G
w0 (X)−m for all m ∈ R.
(iv) Normalization: φu,Gw0 (0) = 0.
Proof. (i) Let X,Y ∈ X . If X ≥ Y , then by Definition 2 and by the increasing monotonicity
of Uu,G,
u(w0) = Uu,G(w0+Y + φu,Gw0 (Y ))
= Uu,G(w0 +X + φu,Gw0 (X))
≥ Uu,G(w0 + Y + φu,Gw0 (X))
and the increasing monotonicity of Uu,G yields φu,Gw0 (X) ≤ φu,Gw0 (Y ). Thus, φu,Gw0 is monotone
decreasing.
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(ii) If m ∈ R, then by Definition 2,
u(w0) = Uu,G(w0+X + φu,Gw0 (X))
= Uu,G(w0 +X +m+ φu,Gw0 (X +m))
= u(w0)
and the strict monotonicity of Uu,G yields,
φu,Gw0 (X) = m+ φ
u,G
w0 (X +m)
Thus, φu,Gw0 is cash-additive.
(iii) If λ ∈ [0, 1], then by the quasiconcavity of Uu,G and by Definition 2,
Uu,G(w0 + λX + (1− λ)Y + λφu,Gw0 (X) + (1− λ)φu,Gw0 (Y ))
= Uu,G(λ(w0 +X + φu,Gw0 (X)) + (1− λ)(w0 + Y + φu,Gw0 (Y )))
≥ min{Uu,G(w0 +X + φu,Gw0 (X)), Uu,G(w0 + Y + φu,Gw0 (Y ))}
=Uu,G(w0 + λX + (1− λ)Y + φu,Gw0 (λX + (1− λ)Y ))
= u(w0)
and the increasing monotonicity of Uu,G yields,
φu,Gw0 (λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ λφu,Gw0 (X) + (1− λ)φu,Gw0 (Y )
Thus, φu,Gw0 is convex.
(iv) As u is strictly increasing,
u(w0 + φu,Gw0 (0)) = u(w0)
if and only if φu,Gw0 (0) = 0. Thus, φ
u,G
w0 is normalized.
For further characterizations of the indifference seller’s price in terms of its acceptance
set and of its minimal penalty function we refer to Giammarino (2011).
4 Characterizations of Uncertainty Attitudes
In this section we study the characterization of a decision maker’s uncertainty attitudes in
terms of the indifference prices introduced in Section 3. Further results on the characteriza-
tion of uncertainty attitudes will be presented in Section 5 and in Section 6.
Remark 4. Note that the characterizations of the uncertainty attitudes (only) are obtained
as special cases of the characterizations of the risk and uncertainty attitudes (jointly) under
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suitable normalization conditions on the risk attitudes (i.e. on the utility functions).
4.1 Comparative Uncertainty Aversion
The notion of comparative risk and uncertainty aversion presented in Definition 3 is consistent
with the definition of comparative risk aversion of Yaari (1969) and with the definition
of comparative uncertainty aversion of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001). The intuition
underlying the notion of comparative risk and uncertainty aversion presented in Definition 3
is that if a decision maker Uu1,G1 with constant initial wealth w0 prefers a constant monetary
payoff x to an uncertain monetary payoff X, then a more risk and uncertainty averse decision
maker Uu2,G2 with the same constant initial wealth w0 will do the same.
Definition 3. A decision maker Uu1,G1 : X → R is said to be less risk and uncertainty
averse than another Uu2,G2 : X → R if,
u1(w0 + x) ≥ Uu1,G1(w0 +X) ⇒ u2(w0 + x) ≥ Uu2,G2(w0 +X) (4)
for all X ∈ X , x ∈ R, and w0 ∈ R.
Note that Uu1,G1 is said to be more risk and uncertainty averse than Uu2,G2 when the
implication in Equation (4) holds true in the opposite direction and that Uu1,G1 is said to
be as risk and uncertainty averse as Uu2,G2 when the implication in Equation (4) holds true
in both directions.
Remark 5. Note that the definition of comparative uncertainty aversion is obtained as a
particular case of Definition 3 requiring that u1 ≈ u21. This normalization condition ensures
that both decision makers Uu1,G1 and Uu2,G2 display the same risk attitudes u1 and u2 and
that, as a consequence, their choices are compared only in terms of their different uncertainty
attitudes G1 and G2 (see Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a, Section 3.3)).
Theorem 1 asserts that a decision maker is less risk and uncertainty averse than another if
and only if the maximum price that she would offer to avoid an uncertain monetary prospect
(e.g. to receive insurance) or, equivalently, the minimum price that she would demand to
accept and uncertain monetary prospect (e.g. to provide insurance), is smaller than for the
the other at every level of constant initial wealth.
Theorem 1. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) Uu1,G1 is less risk and uncertainty averse than Uu2,G2 .
(ii) piu1,G1w0 ≤ piu2,G2w0 for all w0 ∈ R.
(iii) φu1,G1w0 ≤ φu2,G2w0 for all w0 ∈ R.
1That is,u1 = αu2 + β for some α ∈ (0,+∞) and β ∈ R.
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Proof. Let X ∈ X and x ∈ R. (i)⇔ (ii) By Definition 3 and Definition 1, Uu1,G1 is less risk
and uncertainty averse than Uu2,G2 if and only if,
u1(w0 + x) ≥ u1(w0 − piu1,G1w0 (X)) ⇒ u2(w0 + x) ≥ u2(w0 − piu2,G2w0 (X))
that is, since u1 and u2 are strictly increasing, if and only if,
piu1,G1w0 (X) ≥ −x ⇒ piu2,G2w0 (X) ≥ −x
Thus, Uu1,G1 is less risk and uncertainty averse than Uu2,G2 if and only if,
piu1,G1w0 (X) ≤ piu2,G2w0 (X).
(i) ⇔ (iii) By Definition 3 and Definition 2, Uu1,G1 is less risk and uncertainty averse than
Uu2,G2 if and only if,
Uu1,G1(w0 + x+X + φ
u1,G1
w0+x (X)) ≥ Uu1,G1(w0 +X) ⇒
Uu2,G2(w0 + x+X + φ
u2,G2
w0+x (X)) ≥ Uu2,G2(w0 +X)
that is, since Uu1,G1 and Uu2,G2 are strictly increasing, if and only if,
φu1,G1w0+x (X) ≥ −x ⇒ φu2,G2w0+x (X) ≥ −x
Thus, Uu1,G1 is less risk and uncertainty averse than Uu2,G2 if and only if,
φu1,G1w0+x (X) ≤ φu2,G2w0+x (X).
Remark 6. Note that Theorem 1 implies that Uu1,G1 is as risk and uncertainty averse as
Uu2,G2 if and only if piu1,G1w0 = pi
u2,G2
w0 and φ
u1,G1
w0 = φ
u2,G2
w0 for all w0 ∈ R.
4.2 Increasing, Decreasing, and Constant Uncertainty Aversion
The notion of increasing risk and uncertainty aversion presented in Definition 4 is consistent
with the definition of increasing risk aversion in Kreps (1988, Chapter 6, page 75). The
intuition underlying the notion of increasing uncertainty aversion presented in Definition 4
is that if an increasingly risk and uncertainty averse decision maker Uu,G prefers a constant
monetary payoff x to an uncertain monetary payoff X when her constant initial wealth is
w1, then when her constant initial wealth is increased to w2 she will do the same.
Definition 4. A decision maker Uu,G : X → R is said to be increasingly risk and uncertainty
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averse if,
u(w1 + x) ≥ Uu,G(w1 +X) ⇒ u(w2 + x) ≥ Uu,G(w2 +X) (5)
for all X ∈ X , x ∈ R, and w1, w2 ∈ R such that w1 ≤ w2.
Note that Uu,G is said to be decreasingly risk and uncertainty averse if the implication
in Equation (5) holds true in the opposite direction and that Uu,G is said to be constantly
risk and uncertainty averse if the implication in Equation (5) holds true in both directions.
Remark 7. Note that the definition of increasing uncertainty aversion is obtained as a
particular case of Definition 4 requiring the utility function u to be constantly absolute risk
averse (CARA)2. This normalization condition ensures that the decision maker displays the
same risk aversion at different levels of constant initial wealth w1 and w2 and that, as a
consequences, her choices are compared only in terms of her different uncertainty aversion.
Theorem 2 asserts that a decision maker is increasingly risk and uncertainty averse if and
only if the maximum price that she would offer to avoid an uncertain monetary prospect (e.g.
to receive insurance) or, equivalently, the minimum price that she would demand to accept
an uncertain monetary prospect (e.g. to provide insurance), is larger the larger her constant
initial wealth.
Theorem 2. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) Uu,G is increasingly risk and uncertainty averse.
(ii) piu,Gw1 ≤ piu,Gw2 for all w1, w2 ∈ R such that w1 ≤ w2.
(iii) φu,Gw1 ≤ φu,Gw2 for all w1, w2 ∈ R such that w1 ≤ w2.
Proof. Follows from the same arguments applied in the proof of Theorem 1.
Remark 8. Note that Theorem 2 implies that Uu,G is constantly risk and uncertainty averse
if and only if piu,Gw1 = pi
u,G
w2 and φ
u,G
w1 = φ
u,G
w2 for all w1, w2 ∈ R.
5 Further Characterizations of Uncertainty Attitudes
This section illustrates some further characterizations of increasing, decreasing, and constant
risk and uncertainty aversion which do not rely on the dependence of the indifference prices
on the decision maker’s constant initial wealth w0. The characterization results presented in
this section rely instead on the observation that a decision maker’s increasing, decreasing,
or constant risk and uncertainty aversion describes how her choice between an uncertain
monetary payoff X and a constant monetary payoff x is altered if a positive constant amount
of money m is added to both alternatives.
2A utility function u : R→ R is CARA if it is either linear u(x) = αx+ β or exponential u(x) = −αe−θx
with α, θ > 0 and β ∈ R.
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5.1 Cash-Subadditivity, Cash-Superadditivity, and Cash-Additivity
Increasing, decreasing, and constant risk and uncertainty aversion are equivalently charac-
terized by the additive properties that the indifference buyer’s price satisfies with respect
to the constant monetary payoffs m for any given w0. Theorem 3 asserts that a decision
maker is increasingly risk and uncertainty averse if and only if the indifference buyer’s price
is a cash-subadditive quasiconvex risk measure. The property of cash-subadditivity was in-
troduced in the mathematical finance literature on risk measures by El Karoui and Ravanelli
(2009) to model the impact of default risk and interest rate ambiguity on the overall risk of
a financial or insurance contract. The property of cash-subadditivity is a weakening of the
property of cash-additivity considered by Deprez and Gerber (1985), Frittelli and Rosazza
Gianin (2002), and Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002).
Theorem 3. A decision maker Uu,G : X → R is increasingly risk and uncertainty averse if
and only if,
piu,Gw0 (X +m) ≥ piu,Gw0 (X)−m
for all m ∈ [0,+∞) and X ∈ X .
Proof. Let X ∈ X , x ∈ R and m ∈ [0,+∞). By Definition 4, Uu,G is increasingly risk and
uncertainty averse if and only if,
u(w0 + x) ≥ Uu,G(w0 +X) ⇒ u(w0 + x+m) ≥ Uu,G(w0 +X +m)
It follows from Definition 1 that Uu,G is increasingly risk and uncertainty averse if and only
if,
u(w0 + x) ≥ u(w0 − piu,Gw0 (X)) ⇒ u(w0 +m+ x) ≥ u(w0 − piu,Gw0 (X +m))
or, equivalently, as u is strictly increasing, if and only if,
piu,Gw0 (X) ≥ −x ⇒ piu,Gw0 (X +m) +m ≥ −x
Thus, Uu,G is increasingly risk and uncertainty averse if and only if,
piu,Gw0 (X +m) ≥ piu,Gw0 (X)−m.
Remark 9. Note that Theorem 3 implies that Uu,G is constantly risk and uncertainty averse
if and only if piu,Gw0 (X + m) = pi
u,G
w0 (X) − m for all m ∈ R and X ∈ X . As a quasiconvex
risk measure which is cash-additive is necessarily convex (see Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011b)),
the indifference buyer’s price of a constantly risk and uncertainty averse decision maker is a
cash-additive convex risk measure.
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5.2 Inequalities
As a consequence of Theorem 3, increasing, decreasing, and constant risk and uncertainty
aversion are equivalently characterized by the inequalities that the indifference prices fulfill
for every w0.
Theorem 4. A decision maker Uu,G : X → R is increasingly risk and uncertainty averse if
and only if,
piu,Gw0 (X) ≤ φu,Gw0 (X)
for all X ∈ X such that φu,Gw0 (X) ∈ [0,+∞).
Proof. Let X ∈ X . By Definition 1 and by Definition 2,
u(w0 − piu,Gw0 (X + φu,Gw0 (X))) = Uu,G(w0 +X + φu,Gw0 (X)) = u(w0)
and the strict monotonicity of u yields,
0 = piu,Gw0 (X + φ
u,G
w0 (X))
Thus, by Theorem 3, Uu,G is increasingly risk and uncertainty averse if and only if,
0 = piu,Gw0 (X + φ
u,G
w0 (X)) ≥ piu,Gw0 (X)− φu,Gw0 (X)
for all X ∈ X such that φu,Gw0 (X) ∈ [0,+∞).
Remark 10. Note that Theorem 4 implies that Uu,G is constantly risk and uncertainty
averse if and only if piu,Gw0 (X) = φ
u,G
w0 (X) for all X ∈ X .
6 Increasingly, Decreasingly, and Constantly Uncertainty
Averse Preferences
In this section we study the characterization of uncertainty attitudes in terms of the un-
certainty index G appearing in the uncertainty averse representation of preferences Uu,G in
Equation (1). As remarked in Section 4, in order to characterize a decision maker’s uncer-
tainty attitudes (as reflected by G), it is necessary to impose some suitable normalization
conditions on her risk attitudes (as reflected by u).
The uncertainty averse representations of preferences that are minimally and maximally un-
certainty averse consistently with the notion of comparative uncertainty aversion in Definition
3 and Remark 5 were studied by Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a). Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a,
Proposition 6) found that a decision maker Uu1,G1 is more uncertainty averse than another
Uu2,G2 for any choice of u1 and u2 such that u1 ≈ u2 if and only if G1 ≤ G2.
12
In this section we study the uncertainty averse representations of preferences that are in-
creasingly, decreasingly, and constantly uncertainty averse consistently with the notion of
increasing, decreasing, and constant uncertainty aversion in Definition 4 and Remark 7. We
find that a decision maker Uu,G is increasingly uncertainty averse for any choice of u in the
class of CARA utility functions if and only if G is star-shaped3 and cash-subadditive.
The property of star-shapedness was introduced in the mathematical finance literature by
Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011b) to model the impact of liquidity risk on the minimal reserve
amount that must be added to an uncertain monetary payoff such that it becomes accept-
able to a decision maker. The property of star-shapedness is a weakening of the property of
positive homogeneity4 considered by Artzner et al. (1997, 1999).
Theorem 5. A decision maker Uu,G : X → R is increasingly uncertainty averse for any
choice of u : R→ R in the class of CARA utility functions if and only if,
G(λx+m,P ) ≤ λG(x, P ) +m
for all λ ∈ (0, 1], m ∈ [0,+∞), and (x, P ) ∈ R×∆.
Proof. Let X ∈ X and (x, P ) ∈ R × ∆. Without loss of generality, set w0 = 0. The
indifference buyer’s price piL,G0 defined in terms of the linear utility function L(y) = y for all
y ∈ R is given by,
piL,G0 (X) = sup
P∈∆
−G(EP [X], P )
and by Drapeau and Kupper (2010, Proposition 2.11) it is cash-subadditive if and only if
G(x+m,P ) ≤ G(x, P ) +m for all m ∈ [0,+∞).
The indifference buyer’s price piE,G0 defined in terms of the exponential utility function E(y) =
−e−y for all y ∈ R is given by,
piE,Gw0 (X) = ln
(
sup
P∈∆
−G(EP [−e−X ], P )
)
and it is cash-subadditive if and only if G(λx, P ) ≤ λG(x, P ) for all λ ∈ (0, 1].
It follows that the indifference buyer’s price piu,Gw0 is cash-subadditive for any choice of u in the
class of CARA utility functions if and only if G(λx+m,P ) ≤ λG(x, P ) +m for all λ ∈ (0, 1]
and m ∈ [0,+∞). Thus, the statement follows from Theorem 3 and Remark 7.
Remark 11. Note that Theorem 5 implies that Uu,G is constantly uncertainty averse for any
choice of u in the class of CARA utility functions if and only if G(λx+m,P ) = λG(x, P )+m
for all λ ∈ (0,+∞), m ∈ R, and (x, P ) ∈ R×∆. Thus, the uncertainty index of a constantly
uncertainty averse decision maker is cash-additive and positively homogeneous.
3A function h : R→ R is said to be star-shaped if h(λx) ≤ λh(x) for all λ ∈ (0, 1] and x ∈ R.
4A function h : R → R is said to be positively homogeneous if h(λx) = λh(x) for all λ ∈ (0,+∞) and
x ∈ R.
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Example 1. By Theorem 5, the variational representation of preferences Uu,c : X → R is
decreasingly uncertainty averse. In fact, as c(P ) ≥ 0 for all P ∈ ∆, the uncertainty index
G : R×∆→ (−∞,+∞] in Equation (2) satisfies,
G(λx+m,P ) = λx+m+ c(P )
≥ λx+m+ λc(P )
= λG(x, P ) +m
for all λ ∈ (0, 1], m ∈ R, and (x, P ) ∈ R×∆.
Example 2. By Theorem 5, the multiple priors representation of preferences Uu,P : X → R
is constantly uncertainty averse. In fact, as for every P ∈ ∆ either δ(P | P) = 0 or δ(P | P) =
+∞, the uncertainty index G : R×∆→ (−∞,+∞] in Equation (3) satisfies,
G(λx+m,P ) = λx+m+ δ(P | P)
= λx+m+ λδ(P | P)
= λG(x, P ) +m
for all λ ∈ (0,+∞), m ∈ R, and (x, P ) ∈ R×∆.
7 Conclusion
In this paper the indifference buyer’s price and the indifference seller’s price are defined in
terms of the uncertainty averse representation of preferences of Cerreia Vioglio et al. (2011a).
The indifference buyer’s price is a quasiconvex risk measure and the indifference seller’s price
is a cash-additive convex risk measure. A decision maker is more uncertainty averse than
another if and only if her indifference prices are pointwise larger than the other’s. A decision
maker is increasingly (respectively, decreasingly, constantly) uncertainty averse if and only
if her indifference prices are increasing (respectively, decreasing, constant) functions of her
constant initial wealth. Future research might investigate the extension of the analysis of
this paper to a dynamic setting along the lines of Frittelli and Maggis (2011a,b).
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